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Introduction
There is a paradox in Japan's external trade. Merchandise exports and imports have been less than 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the late 1980s 1 -the lowest among the group of seven (G7) countries (except for the United States) 2 -and yet when one turns to individual commodities, one finds Japan's dependence on foreign trade to be the highest among these countries on both the export and import sides.
For instance, in 1987, 82% of watches and clocks, 64% of VTRs, and 57% of passenger cars produced in Japan were exported, 3 and 100% of crude petroleum and iron ore and 86% of wheat consumed in Japan were imported.
The paradox arises from the structure of Japan's international trade, that is, from its high dependence on a few major commodities on both the export and import sides.
This structure implies that, should, for some reason, Japan's exports and/or imports be severely disrupted, the Japanese economy would be thrown into an economic chaos of formidable magnitude. Such was the case with the first oil shock of 1973-74. As the price of petroleum quadrupled, Japan's trade went into a deficit and its economy was thrown into a heavy recession coupled with a high inflation. On the other hand, when the terms of trade turn in favor of Japan, the economy enjoys a boom with stable prices as in the latest boom which began at the end of 1986. Japan's growth and inflation are quite sensitive to external economic conditions despite its low aggregate dependence on the foreign sector.
Though Japan's dependence on other countries is high for both exports and 1 imports, this article is limited to a review of Japan's import dependence for resource goods, namely, foods, fuels, and crude materials. 4 The next section of the article reviews the deepening of Japan's dependence on resource imports, section 3 examines the supply side and the demand side of resource imports, and section 4 considers the possibility of structural change of the Japanese economy.
Japan's dependence on resource imports
The fatal weakness of Japan as an economy is in its poor resource endowments.
For instance, it has no reserves of petroleum in its land and the whole of petroleum it consumes has to be imported. In fact, the lack of petroleum, if nothing else, doomed Japan's military pursuits in World War II. The situation became worse after World
War II as Japan lost its overseas territories that supplied raw materials. As the economy recovered and started to grow in the 1950s, the need for resources expanded.
As exports were limited, it was necessary to place imports under strict government control. Imports of primary goods were given priority in foreign exchange allocation.
Imports of nonessential goods such as consumer goods were discouraged. This bias still lingers in Japan's import structure.
As the Japanese economy kept up its growth and Japan's exports became internationally competitive, the balance-of-payments constraint was gradually relaxed and imports were allowed more freedom. As resource imports were liberalized, their share of total resource supplies continued to increase. In the case of farm products, agricultural policy was in a somewhat schizophrenic state. On the one hand, the rapid growth of the 1960s required a massive relocation of workers from agriculture to industry. To offset the resulting contraction of farm output, it became necessary to increase food imports. On the other hand, the government wanted to protect the economic interest of farmers (who were the staunch supporters of the ruling political party) through income maintenance and price support. For this purpose, the government placed import restrictions on many agricultural products. Agriculture was far more protected in Japan than elsewhere in the world. 5 These restrictions (except for rice) have been gradually relaxed, however.
See Table 1 for changes in the self-sufficiency ratio (the ratio of domestic output to total supplies) for a number of primary goods from 1960 to 1987. A few different patterns of change are observed in the self-sufficiency ratios of agricultural and fishing products. Rice, vegetables, and fish remained highly self-sufficient throughout the period under review. Fruits, meat, and milk and dairy products witnessed a slow decline from full self-sufficiency. Wheat and pulse (including soybeans) were less selfsufficient to begin with and became even less so over time. Exceptions are sugar and oils and fats, whose dependence on imports remained relatively high but fell over time in recent years.
In interpreting data of this table, however, one must take care because a high self-sufficiency ratio may be the result of agricultural protection (as in the case of rice, fruits, meat, and milk and dairy products). Rice remains self-sufficient because of the continuing protection of rice on both production and distribution that was instituted 3 during World War II for the sake of food security. The need for the control remained after World War II because of the supply shortage. But soon rice production recovered, while rice consumption has been steadily falling. 6 Thus, the need for rice control disappeared a long time ago. Nonetheless, the government still refuses to decontrol rice. The consequence is a persistent overproduction as the official price of rice has been kept high. The true intention of the government is no longer food security but providing special favors to rice farmers who have been staunch supporters of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party.
The United States is the largest exporter of rice, and among foreign strains of rice the rice produced in the southern U.S. is the closest to sticky Japanese rice. Thus the U.S. wants Japan to open its domestic rice market to American rice but Japan adamantly refuses to comply. Rice has been one of the unresolved trade issues between the U.S. and Japan. The Engel coefficient (food expenditure divided by total consumption expenditure) has been falling -from 41.6% in 1960 to 25.5% in 1988. Excluding rice, the fall has been more modest ~ from 31.2% to 23.7%. As the standard of living has been rising, the real value of food consumption (other than rice) has been increasing.
In this process, Japanese diets have become richer and more Westernized. Westernization of Japanese diets has increased protein intake. But self-4 sufficiency has fallen only moderately for meat and milk and dairy products? Though one may be tempted to attribute the fall to the quota restrictions on these products, 8 the fact is that meat is produced at home by feeding grains that are imported. Thus, when one eats domestically produced meat, one is in fact consuming imported feed grains. For that matter, the high degree of self-sufficiency in fish is also illusory because the Japanese fishing fleet must depend on imported petroleum to go on its long-distance fishing expeditions.
As consumers turned from rice to bread, wheat imports rose. Soybeans, the raw material for Japan's daily necessities ~ tofu, soy sauce, and miso condiments --are nowadays imported mostly from the U.S. Japanese soybeans, even though superior in quality, could not compete in price with imported soybeans.
Japan was nearly self-sufficient in lumber in the 1960s, but nearly two-thirds of its lumber was imported in the 1970s and the 1980s -such as pinewood from the Northwest of the U.S. and lauan wood from the Philippines. Japanese houses are now built with imported lumber. 9 In terms of fuel calories, as shown by figures for 1987, Japan's primary energy is supplied nearly 80% (in 1987) by coal (18.0%) and petroleum (59.8%). Imports accounted for 89.4% of the coal and 99.7% of the petroleum. 10 Coal was once indigenously supplied but domestic coal mines could not compete with foreign supplies and most of them were phased out. Thus Japan's energy supply is mostly (82% in 1987) imported.
For mineral ores, the story is more or less the same. Iron and copper ores are almost wholly imported. Supplies of lead, zinc, tungsten, and other ores are a little better but they have become increasingly more import-dependent.
Until the first oil shock, Japan grew even more rapidly than other countries and its imports expanded even faster. Thus Japan's resource imports came to command an increasing share of world imports of resource goods as seen in Table 2 . Since then, Japan's imports of crude materials and mineral fuels have slowed down. Thus, their shares of world imports reached a peak in 1970 for crude materials (SITC 2+4) and in the mid-1970s for mineral fuels (SITC 3).
At the three-digit SITC level, Japan's shares of world imports of primary goods is often very high. As shown in Table 3 , Japan ranked first in 20 SITC three-digit categories, second in 6 categories, and third in 11 categories. Japan's world-market share is extremely high in several categories, commanding more than one-quarter of world imports. 11 Even when Japan is not the top importer, the concentration of imports is so marked that Japan's demand when combined with that of other top importers can exert a profound influence on the world market, as is the case with crude petroleum. 12 This sort of market domination may give rise to serious international friction when Japan's tastes significantly differ from Western tastes. The best current example of this nature is Japan's imports of African elephant tusks. Ivorv has been a commodity in strong demand in Japan for making personal seals, mah jong sets, 6 personal accessories, and various objects d'art, Even though trade in ivory was illegal in Africa, smuggling went on. Japan ivory imports were legal insofar as they came through a third country. Thus, in 1987, some 130 tons of ivory were legally imported into Japan, mostly via Hong Kong, accounting for about 40% of world ivory output. 13 Ivory is the most flagrant but not the only case of this nature. 14 
3.
The Supply Side and the Demand Side
Resource imports are both a cause and an effect of macroeconomic activity.
They are sensitive to supply shocks and demand shocks. Supply shocks, which originate overseas, became notable in the 1970s, especially during the two oil crises of 1973-74
and 1979-80. They significantly affect the country's growth and inflation. Demand shocks originate in Japan, and influence the economies of materials-supplying countries.
A. The supply side. A supply shock occurs when the supply curve of a commodity shifts abruptly due to natural or artificial causes. There have seldom been absolute restrictions on quantities supplied, however. 15 The oil shock of 1973-74 created havoc in Japan because the Japanese mistook the action of the OPEC for a quantity restriction rather than a sharp price increase. Nonetheless, it is true that the more dependent an economy is on resource imports, the more vulnerable it becomes to an adverse supply shock. When a country depends virtually wholly on imported key materials, it can become an economic hostage of supplying countries. Resource imports then are an Achilles' heel for such a country. For a country to safeguard against such vulnerability, it must prepare for the contingency. There are a number of alternative ways to do this.
The first is to produce the material at home regardless of the costs that involves.
The best example of this is rice. Rice production continues to be protected in Japan despite its extremely high costs, and the reason for this protection is allegedly food security.
The second alternative is to enter into a long-term contract with a principal supplier. This arrangement, however, is difficult to maintain in a real world where the market price of the commodity tends to fluctuate a great deal.
The third alternative is to invest overseas for resource development. Japan did so in developing petroleum resources in Indonesia and the Middle East. This line of action, however, encounters strong resistance from host countries under resource nationalism. Further, when the host country is politically unstable, the political risk can be considerable. 16 In earlier years through the 1960s, resource development took a lion's share of Japan's overseas direct investment. Since then, its share has been steadily falling. 17 The fourth alternative is to promote technological innovations toward materials saving at home. When the price of a material, for instance, petroleum, is raised, firms that use that material as an intermediate input would reduce the use of the material under a given technology. This is what economic theory calls the substitution effect.
When, however, the price increase is large and is anticipated to be permanent, firms would respond in a more fundamental manner by altering technology itself so as to As Japan's trade surplus expanded globally, a new dimension was added in international tension in the sphere of Japan's overseas investment. As the currentaccount surplus was invested in foreign assets, Japan became the largest net creditor in the world in the late 1980s while the U.S. became the largest net debtor.
In this scheme, the terms of trade, that is, the relative prices of resources imported, play a key role. As the international prices of resource goods fell substantially in the late 1980s, Japan needed to pay less for imports at any given exchange rate. In a balance-of-payments equilibrium, net exports (exports less imports) are equated to net capital outflows. Imagine that capital flows are insensitive to the exchange rate. Then, when imports become cheaper, the yen has to appreciate in order to reduce net exports to the given level of net capital outflows. The appreciation of the yen makes imports even cheaper (in yen). As the input prices are thus lowered, the upward pressure on export prices is reduced. The reduction in Japan's exports is thereby checked. Trade frictions tend to be exacerbated when primary prices become lower. Thus the recent rise in trade frictions, especially with the U.S., can be attributed in large measure to the cheapening of primary goods.
To de-escalate trade frictions, it is essential to alter Japan's trade structure in a fundamental manner, especially bringing in a shift from resource imports to imports of manufactured goods. Would such a shift be possible? We examine this critical issue in the last section.
4. Possibility of structural change. As is well-known, the trade structure is significantly different in Japan from that elsewhere. This feature is made clear in Table   4 which shows the proportion of trade in primary goods (SITC 0-4) in total trade for exports and imports for the G7 countries. Primary goods are almost nil in Japan's exports while the proportion ranges between 10 and 35% in the exports of the other six countries. On the import side, primary goods account for as much as 60% in Japan, far above the proportion found for the other six countries. Not only do manufactured goods constitute a small fraction of Japan's imports but they are also mostly resourcebased goods. This lopsided trade structure was not of much international concern while Japan was a small country. Now that Japan is a large country, it matters a good deal.
A basic change is clearly evident in Japan's import structure, marking the first oil crisis as the turning point. The change manifests itself in substantial reductions in the income elasticity of demand for crude materials and for mineral fuels 20 as reported in Table 5 . As for the former, it can be explained by a shift from unprocessed to semiprocessed products (which are included in manufactured goods in Table 5 ). This shift, however, is not likely to have altered Japan's bilateral trade balances with primaryexporting countries because it is they who shift production more toward semi-processed forms. To make a difference in this regard then, it is essential to effect a shift in Japan's imports toward finished manufactured goods. It is true that the income elasticity of import demand is quite high for both capital goods and consumer goods. 22 Therefore, given enough time, imports of finished manufactured goods will be expanded in relation to domestic output. But the process seems to be quite slow. Efforts to restructure Japan's imports have to be redoubled.
There are, however, two serious impediments in this regard.
First, increases in consumer good imports may be unevenly distributed over suppliers. Nondurable consumer goods like textiles are low-class goods originating in developing countries (very often produced by Japanese subsidiaries therein). Durable consumer goods are high-class goods supplied mainly from industrial countries. For the latter, Japanese tastes prefer more elegant European goods than plebeian American goods. The U.S. performs poorly as an exporter of finished consumer goods to Japan.
Second, insofar as Japan must continue to export manufactured goods, a certain 13 quantity of imports must be in the form of crude materials or semi-processed goods.
Further, foods and petroleum, whether in raw or semi-processed forms, must continue to be imported in a substantial amount. These import requirements impose an upper bound on the quantity of finished manufactured goods Japan will import.
We have seen that Japan's high dependence on resource imports has given rise to international friction as Japan's economic size continues to grow vis-a-vis that of other countries. This dependence is not to disappear even when a structural change is effected. How to integrate Japan into the world's economic community under these circumstances is a challenge not only to Japan but also to the world. The protectionist solution of containing Japan is not a solution as it reduces the world's total economic welfare. 
